Islam in the Post-Cold War Era

Appendix-I
Islam and Politics in Pakistan

Islam has played a decisive role in Pakistan's history. Religious institutions collaborated with the feudal power structure for common interests in retaining the status quo and still pose a threat to any real social transformation. The dubious ruling regimes and opposition movements trying to dislodge them, both exploited Islam to the utmost. Those in power, used religious sentiments of ignorant masses to maintain their power and those thirsting for power, exploited the same sentiments in an attempt to maneuver their way in.

Hence, the process of the so-called Islamization worked to the satisfaction of all privileged segments of the society, namely military, bureaucracy, land owners and industrialists. The military elite found status quo continuation easy with Islamization as the economically deprived lower cadres of the army got solace in it, thanks to their traditional background. The civil bureaucracy that has learnt the art of surviving in all sorts of governments found it safe and secure, si nce Islamization has not substantially altered the socio-political realities in Pakistan. The land-owning and business classes enjoyed enough protection in legitimization of unlimited private property. The nominal land reforms introduced during Ayub and Bhutto's era were reversed in the name of Islam.

Islam has never been an issue in Pakistan. In fact, even those parties which talk of scientific socialism or secular politics did not ignore the potential and popularity of the faith in electoral politics. What however, is a matter of concern is the emergence of propagation of an idea that Islam is opposed to progress and enlightenment.

The emergence of Pakistan on the world map left the ulema high and dry since most of them opposed its creation. Soon after independence, when the administration of the new state was coping with huge problems arising out of the partition of the subcontinent, the ulema began arousing the religious passions of the people to get an "Islamic Constitution" passe d by the Constituent Assembly.

The cry of 'Islam in danger' was a powerful weapon in the struggle for Pakistan. Every contemporary politician was aware of the risk that too adventurous policy would be greeted with the dangerous words, 'Islam betrayed.' The politicians therefore wished at least to preserve a facade of harmony on religious matters until the state should be more firmly established. Therefore the post independence period presented the political leadership with the problem of the role of Islam in the structure of the new state. This however, was overshadowed by the need for political stability. Most political leaders and the "moderates" among the men of religion wanted to see a new flexibility in the social and political thinking in Islam. But to pursue this issue before the new constitution had been brought into operation, would have been to invite confusion and conflict.

Politics is 'the art of the possible' and in the long run depends upon convincing the convincible and politically active middle section of the population towards a particular course of action or way of life. Each succeeding government in Pakistan hence thought it suitable to continue with the agencies established to find out the methods for Islamization of the laws and the social structure. As a device to appease the ulema and illiterate mass of the people, the political leadership conceded that if the Quran has clear guidance to offer on any matter, then that guidance must be followed.

Ironically, it was the socialist and secular Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who started the process of Islamic fundamentalism in the country. The 1973 constitution contains a number of clauses which later paved the way for the Islamization of laws. He was responsible to declare the Ahmadis constitutionally as non-Muslims. To Islamize the society, he declared Friday as holiday instead of Sunday, and introduced the subjects of Islamiyat as compulsory subject for the students. He invited the Imam of Ka'ba to Pakistan to lead the pray ers. However, these initiatives could not save him from the ultimate disaster and he became the victim of his own acts and deeds when almost all the religious parties joined hand in launching a campaign against him.

Bhutto's successor, General Ziaul Haq fully utilized the process of Islamization to achieve his political ends and sought legitimacy by implementing Islam as an ideology of Pakistan. General Zia, with the help of state institutions, weakened the secular and progressive forces and introduced the Hudood, Qisas and Diyat in the legal system of the country. The Federal Shariat Court was established through an amendment to the constitution with the powers to examine and decide the question whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. (Article 203D of the constitution). The Federal Shariat Court (FSC) has proved as a law-demolishing agency in conflict with parliament as the constitutionally sovereign legislative body. The Council of Islamic Ideology, anoth er constitutional body, has restricted itself to a negative role; to identify what is 'repugnant' to Islam without spelling out the alternative which is 'in conformity' with Islam.

The Islamization process, which was used as a political weapon, has caused severe damage to our national life. Wrong interpretation of Islam has resulted in the rise of fundamentalism, obscurantism and retrogression. Since the death of General Zia, inconsistency and instability prevails in our laws. Instability means that the law is frequently changing or is under threat of change because of differences of opinion among the ruling factions. Three of the most obvious inconsistencies in our Islamic law are (a) those between legal norms and socially observed norms; (b) those between statutory legal norms and the norms applied in practice in the courts (e.g. Hadd is difficult to implement as confession, retraction of confession and strict standards of proof make it difficult to execute); (c) those between different formal legal norms (e.g. non-compliance with the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance is compromised by the courts but is strictly punished under the Zina Ordinance). Another example of this contradiction is that the constitution assures women equal status on the one hand but, on the other hand, they are greatly discriminated in criminal law.

With the passing of the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance in 1990, the victim (or heirs of the victim) of a crime now have the right to inflict injuries on the offender identical to the ones sustained by the victim. The law also allows offenders to absolve themselves of the crime by paying compensation to the victim or their heirs. In the already existing system of bribery and corruption, it gives free hand to the people with money. The Human Rights activists rightly say that in effect this means, that rich people can get away even with willful murder.

The interpretation of the Shariah Act of 1991 has been challenged by the Federal Shariat Court. Sections 3(2) and 19 of the Act, which safeguard the existing political system and the country's financial obligations (including interest payments), have been declared un-Islamic by the FSC because of the riba (interest) involved. In its ruling of January 1992, [the Court held that rules and regulations relating to interest were repugnant to the Quran and Sunnah and should be brought in accordance with Islam. This ruling was embarrassing to the government, while on the one hand they wanted to satisfy the traditionalists, on the other hand the ruling was not in accordance with the government's international obligations. A private appeal was thus lodged with the Supreme Court against the FSC decision. Other rulings of the FSC in 1992 included one stating that the country's system of employment quotas was un-Islamic, as was the charging of court fees.

Women became the special victims of Islamization of law and its inconsistencies. The Zina Ordinances, which have been particularly discriminatory against women, continued to be law despite all the demands from women's organization. [See Chapter VIII for detailed discussion.) As always, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 is continuously under challenge. In 1992, there was an interesting case in the Supreme Court where the court declared Section 7 of the ordinance to be against Islam.

The government of Benazir Bhutto promoted Pakistan as a moderate Islamic state. A booklet published by the Ministry of Information -- entitled, Pakistan: a moderate Islamic state -- acknowledges that "from late 1970s to mid-1980s, Pakistan often found itself specially featuring in (western media) despatches about "Islamic Fundamentalism," an expression depicting religious intolerance. The despatches brought out Pakistan as an irrational society suppressing minorities, contemptuous of human rights, treating women as inferior and generally living inside a cocoon of faith debarring contemporary compellings. Such negative references have not been totally abandoned but their frequency has considerab ly declined in the last about ten years. Some recent developments recreated misgivings vis-a-vis fundamentalism in Pakistan as blasphemy erupted as an issue. However, a superior court restored the confidence of the people in the state's commitment to a learned approach. The court's objective and dispassionate handling of the case has re-emphasized an enlightened approach which is further sustained by the government's negotiations and consultations with leaders of religious political parties and scholars to affect amendments in the existing laws on blasphemy to incorporate safeguards against exploitation of any segment of the population.

In May 1995, the federal cabinet approved two amendments in the blasphemy law -- i.e. article 295-C of Pakistan Penal Code. The amendments stipulate ten years' prison term for instituting a false blasphemy charge against anyone and forbids registration of any First Information Report (FIR) on this count without a preliminary investigation by a judicial officer, not belo w the rank of deputy commissioner, as to the veracity of the allegation. However, the proposal met severe resistance from religious and other groups. The Provincial Assembly of the Punjab passed a resolution against the proposal on May 4, 1995. This was the second resolution of the Punjab Assembly on the issue. On April 20, 1994, the Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution urging the federal government to maintain the blasphemy law as such. On June 29, 1995, the Provincial Assembly of Baluchistan also passed unanimously a similar resolution.

The government has now deferred its decision to bring the bill, to amend the blasphemy law, before parliament since it was not in a position to pass the legislation. In the meantime, the government has instituted administrative changes to the procedures for filing blasphemy charges. Formerly, individuals could be charged with blasphemy if any individual filed an FIR with the police. Now, formal charges cannot be levied until a magistrate has investigated the alle gations and determined that they were credible
under the law.

The US Assistant Secretary of state, Robin Raphel, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations sub-committee, on March 7, 1996, said that the United States recognize that the religious parties in Pakistan have "street power" and not "ballot power" and this is a major constraint for the Benazir Bhutto's government to repeal blasphemy laws. She revealed that more than 150 blasphemy cases have been lodged in Pakistan since 1986. Most of these have been brought against members of the Ahmadi community. None of the cases against Ahmadis have resulted in convictions. During the same period, at least nine cases have been brought against Christians and nine against Muslims. There have been convictions in some of these cases, but no one has been executed under the law's mandatory death penalty. Some convictions have been overturned and several individuals are currently appealing their convictions.

The Lahore High Court , on February 22, 1995, acquitted Salamat Masih and Rehmat Masih from blasphemy charges. They were sentenced to death by a Sessions Judge on February 9, 1995, for allegedly writing blasphemous word on the wall of a mosque in 1993. The death sentence was quickly overturned following an international uproar. During the appeal hearings there were almost daily demonstrations by small religious groups demanding that the sentence should be carried out. After the judgment, religious groups observed a protest day throughout Pakistan to protest against the acquittal.

The year 1995 also witnessed a ghastly incident of religious frenzy, when Dr. Sajjad Farooq, was beaten to death by people outside a police station in Gujranwala. He was declared an apostate and accused of having desecrated the Holy Quran. Dr. Farooq, who was later reported by the press to be a staunch Muslim, was dragged out from the police station where he was lodged and stoned to death by frenzied mobs. On the basis of a rumor, apparently circu lated by someone out of personal enmity, through loud-speakers of the mosques in his locality he was proclaimed to be a Christian. While religious fanaticism of one sort or another has tended to manifest itself in Pakistan in occasional incidents from time to time, many in the country are now beginning to regard it almost as sacrosanct. The so-called Islamization of Pakistan during late General Ziaul Haq's regime has imbued the fanatics with a spirit of self-righteousness which can only be regarded as alarming in any civilized society.

Islam, which should have served to unite the people of Pakistan -- over 90 percent of them being Muslims -- has been, and is being, misused to divide them into mutually hostile sectarian groups and to divert their attention from basic social and economic problems. The myth of popular support for religious parties has repeatedly been exploded by the electorate. Yet, sectarian and religious hate mongers have proliferated. Major parties are courting leaders of religious pa rties, while latter's militias continue fanning the flames of sectarianism. The only all-Pakistan force that seems to be growing uniformly is sectarianism.

1958 CONSTITUTION
ZULFIQAR ALI BHUTTO (1971-1977)
GENERAL ZIAUL HAQ (1977-1988)